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Capitalism as religion: 
a bolstered defense1
Capitalismo como religião: 
uma defesa fortalecida
Abstract
Under the influence of Max Weber, Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben argue 
for (CiR): the claim that capitalism is identical to a religion. Yet, these defenses of 
(CiR) seem quite easily refutable. This is insofar as it is not clear whether they:(i) 
rely on a plausible use of the terms “capitalism” and “religion”; (ii) spell out the 
justificatory resource that backs up belief in (CiR); and (iii) show the pertinence 
of revising ordinary use of language in calling “religious people”, apparently 
non-religious people who supposedly would follow the religion of capitalism. It 
is this essay’s aim, then, to bolster Benjamin’s and Agamben’s defense of (CiR) by 
articulating a new defense of this claim that accomplishes (i) to (iii) and reads 
Donald Trump as a “reverend” of the religion of capitalism. 
Keywords: Capitalism; Religion; Weber; Benjamin; Agamben
1 I dedicate this essay to my father, Abilio de Souza Moreira, who passed away from Covid-19 on 
January 17th of 2021 and whose financial support facilitated my career in philosophy. Although 
my father described himself as a Catholic, his way of being, at least in my view, had a quite Pro-
testant vein that inspired the view articulated in this essay. I also would like to thank Amanda 
Moreira and Irene Olivero for valuable comments on previous versions of this essay, which was 
mainly written during the first months of the Covid-19 pandemic when Donald Trump was still 
president of the USA. Let me also underline that I tend to endorse a claim that due to space cons-
traints was not supported here: some representatives of the American democratic party, such as 
Joe Biden, are likewise believers of the religion of capitalism, even though they implicitly follow 
a sect distinct from Trump’s.
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Resumo
Sob a influência de Max Weber, Walter Benjamin e Giorgio Agamben defendem 
(CéR): a alegação que o capitalismo é idêntico a uma religião. No entanto, essas 
defesas de (CéR) parecem facilmente refutáveis. Isso se dá porque não é claro 
se elas: (i) adotam um uso plausível dos termos “capitalismo” e “religião”; (ii) 
explicitam o recurso justificatório que fundamenta a crença em (CéR); e (iii) 
mostram a pertinência de revisar a linguagem ordinária, ao chamar de “pessoas 
religiosas”, pessoas aparentemente não religiosas que pretensamente seguiriam a 
religião do capitalismo. A pretensão desse artigo, por conseguinte, é fortalecer as 
defesas de Benjamin e de Agamben de (CéR) por meio da articulação de uma 
nova defesa dessa alegação que satisfaz (i) a (iii) e lê Donald Trump como um 
“reverendo” da religião do capitalismo.
Palavras-chave: Capitalismo; Religião; Weber; Benjamin; Agamben.
Influenced by Max Weber, Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben defend that:
(CiR): Capitalism is identical to a religion.2 
Yet, their defenses seem quite easily refutable in that it is not clear whether 
they explicitly fulfill a semantic, an epistemic and a revisionist condition. 
The semantic condition is that a plausible use of the terms “capitalism” and 
“religion” must be proposed. Failure to satisfy this condition (e.g., in using the 
term “religion” in an undefined or excessively broad way that, say, suggests 
that the activity of cheering for a soccer team is also a religion) may render 
(CiR) into a vague or uninteresting claim, e.g., an analytic or somehow tri-
vially true by definition claim. The epistemic condition is that a justificatory 
resource that backs up belief in (CiR) must be spelled out. Otherwise, it may 
be argued that (CiR) is an unpersuasive, false or even upfront false claim. The 
2  See Weber, M. Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. NY: Routledge: 1992; Benjamin, W. 
“Capitalism as Religion”, in Selected Writings: Volume 1 1913-1926, ed. Bullock, M., and Jennings, 
M. W. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996; and Agamben, G. Creation and Anarchy: The 
Work of Art and the Religion of Capitalism. California: Stanford University Press, 2019.
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revisionist condition is that it must be shown the pertinence of revising or-
dinary use of language in calling prima facie non-religious people who follow 
the religion of capitalism, religious people. If this condition is not met, (CiR) 
may lead to an absurdity insofar as, say, supposedly “believers of capitalism” 
would be more plausibly described as atheists. 
If none of the stated conditions are met, (CiR) seems to be some sort of 
metaphorical, provocative or even shocking claim that mainly serves one’s 
libertarian tendencies of spelling one’s own uniqueness in causing dissensus 
with a majority that rejects (CiR).3 A majority, let us assume, is a group of 
people that: at a given context seeks to satisfy certain norms (e.g., that one 
is to ignore (CiR) and discuss supposedly more pressing issues); and has 
more power than a minority that violates these norms. It seems, then, mo-
tivated to bolster Benjamin’s and Agamben’s defense of (CiR) by articulating 
a new defense of this claim that fulfills the stated conditions while showing 
that (CiR) is to be read as a literal claim that albeit, indeed, provocative and 
perhaps even shocking, is to serve, not only one’s libertarian tendencies, but 
also egalitarian ones: those of contributing to a community in causing some 
consensus, especially, among “heretics” vis-à-vis the religion of capitalism 
who may be more willing to discuss (CiR).
The Semantic Condition
“Capitalism”
Benjamin and Agamben do not provide definitions of “capitalism.” On his part, 
Weber argues that the concept of capitalism: “must be gradually put together 
out of the individual parts which are taken from historical reality to make it 
up. Thus the final and definitive concept cannot stand at the beginning of the 
investigation, but must come at the end.”4 Weber puts together one part of his 
processual definition of capitalism by stating that: “capitalism is identical with 
the pursuit of profit (…) by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise.”5 
3  For a defense of the claim that continental philosophers influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche 
have often throughout the twentieth century up to our times defended such claims, see my own 
Moreira, F. G. A. “The Will to Synthesis: Nietzsche, Carnap and the Continental-Analytic Gap”, in 
Nietzsche-Studien Volume 49: Issue 1, pp. 150–170, 2020.
4  Weber, Ethic, p. 13.
5  Ibid., xxxi-ii, our emphasis.
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By “capitalist enterprise”, Weber means a business-activity that can be os-
tensibly defined, e.g., by real estate. With the term “profit”, Weber refers to 
a process that takes place when a person performs three actions. First, the 
person invests money into a business-activity. Second, the person freely or 
somehow freely opts to engage oneself in this activity. An option is somehow 
free, suppose, when one might have experienced a “subtle” form of violence or 
coercion into joining it, say, in being afraid to be: extremely financially poor; 
dependent on others; financially independent, but isolated from the rest of 
the community; etc. This kind of violence or coercion may be called “subtle” 
because it is not as often criticized or recognized as more upfront or physical 
forms of oppression, e.g., that of enslaving someone. The third action that cha-
racterizes profit is to gain an amount of money superior to the invested one. 
In qualifying the capitalist enterprise as “rational”, Weber rejects a ste-
reotypical take on capitalism according to which capitalism is an emotional or 
irrational urge to acquire money.6 Weber states that “unlimited greed for gain 
is not in the least identical with capitalism.”7 Donald Trump points to a simi-
lar direction. In the first page of his first book, the 1987 The Art of the Deal, 
he states that: “I don’t do it for the money.”8 In Weber’s view, then, a business-
-activity is a “rational acquisition” that involves mathematical considerations.9 
Weber also uses the term “continuous” to qualify the capitalist enterprise. He 
indicates that to achieve profit, one must be engaged in a business-activity 
during a significant amount of time. This is the message that Weber derives 
from an excerpt from Benjamin Franklin’s 1748 Advice to a Young Tradesman: 
“Remember, that time is money.” “He”, Franklin continues, “that can earn ten 
shillings a day by his labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that 
day, though he spends but sixpence during his diversion or idleness, ought 
not to reckon that the only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown 
away, five shillings besides.”10 Indeed, “Weber”, as Sam Whimster interprets, 
6  It is not surprising that Weber depicts capitalism as being “rational”, given that, in his view, even 
“religiously or magically motivated behavior is relatively rational behavior.” See Weber, M. Economy 
and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 
p. 400. For a more detailed take on Weber’s view on rationality, see Boudon, R. “La rationalité du 
religieux selon Max Weber”, in: L’Année sociologique, Vol. 51, p. 10, 2001.
7  Weber, Ethic, p. Xxxi.
8  Trump, D., The Art of the Deal. NY: Ballentine Books, 1987, p. 1.
9  Weber, Ethic, p. 115.
10  Ibid., p. 14.
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“takes Franklin to be what we would today perceive as the style of an earnest 
and evangelical business guru.”11 However, as Alastair Hamilton indicates, 
it has been objected that Weber misread Franklin insofar as the view of the 
quoted passage by Franklin is not to be identified with Franklin’s.12 This ob-
jection yet can be answered on Weber’s behalf by claiming that it is secondary 
whether Franklin embraced the view of the passage at stake. What is crucial 
is that this passage spells out a properly capitalist mentality or ethos which 
Weber names the “spirit [Geist] of capitalism.” If not by Franklin, this spirit 
is embodied by others, such as businessmen who have aimed to be capitalist 
gurus in indicating how one can achieve financial success. Consider the first 
chapter of Trump’s The Art of the Deal, where a typical week of Trump’s in the 
1980s is described. This chapter indicates what Trump summarizes in a single 
sentence in his last book: “I’m working all the time.”13 
From the quoted passage by Franklin, Weber also derives the view that 
capitalism is connected to the thesis that to engage oneself freely or somehow 
freely in a profit-seeking business-activity during a significant amount of time 
is a morally good action. Indeed, this action as opposed to that of acquiring 
money would be an end in itself. In Weber’s words: “labour must (…) be per-
formed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling.”14 Trump personifies 
this view when he states: “I do it [that is, engage oneself in a business-activity] 
to do it.”15 Thus capitalism is connected to the view that there is “a duty of the 
individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in 
itself.”16 “Truly”, Weber claims, “what is here preached is not simply a means 
of making one’s way in the world, but a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its 
rules is treated not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty.”17 
So, failure to fulfill this duty by, say, spending pleasurable time with be-
loved ones in having a drink without ascetically seeking profit would be a 
11  Whimster, S. Understanding Weber. NY: Routledge, 2007, p. 55.
12  Hamilton, A. “Max Weber’s Ethic and the Spirt of Capitalism”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Weber, ed. Turner, S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 165.
13  Trump, D. Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America. NY: Threshold Editions, 2015, p. 128.
14  Weber, Ethic, p. 25.
15  Trump, Art, p. 1.
16  Weber, Ethic, p. 17.
17  Id.
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morally wrong action. Trump indicates that the fact that he does not drink 
has made him a better dealmaker: “I remember wondering if every successful 
person in Manhattan was a big drinker. I figured it that was the case, I was 
going to have a big advantage.”18 Weber, then, embraces the following plausi-
ble use of the term “capitalism” likewise endorsed here:
(C
d
): Capitalism is identical to the pursuit of profit through a continuous, 
rational and purportedly morally good business-activity that is supposed 
to be an end in itself.
“Religion”
Weber indicates that he also supports a processual definition of religion in his 
1921 posthumous work Economy and Society. He states: “to define ‘religion,’ 
to say what it is, is not possible at the start of a presentation such as this. 
Definition can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of the study.”19 
Yet, Weber’s procedure regarding the term “religion” is distinct from his pro-
cedure regarding the term “capitalism.” As indicated above, there are several 
passages by Weber that point to a plausible use of the latter. The same is not 
the case regarding the term “religion.” This is why Peter L. Berger concludes 
that Weber never provided such a definition of religion “so that the reader of 
Weber’s opus waits in vain for the promised definitional payoff.”20 
By his turn, Benjamin points to a definition of religion. He states that: “a 
religion may be discerned in capitalism — that is to say, capitalism serves es-
sentially to allay the same anxieties, torments, and disturbances to which the 
so-called religions offered answers.”21 This is evidence that Benjamin embraces 
what has been called a functional definition of religion.22 This kind of defini-
tion defines religion in terms of what it does for its adherents. Émile Durkheim 
18  Trump, Art, p. 86.
19  Weber, Economy and Society, p. 399.
20  Berger, P. L. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. NY: Anchor Books, 
1967, p. 175.
21  Benjamin, “Capitalism”, p. 288.
22  See Berger, Sacred, p. 175; and Schilbrack, K. “What Isn’t Religion?”, in: The Journal of Religion, 
Vol. 93, No. 3, p. 293, July. 2013
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may have been the first to embrace a functional definition. According to him, 
religion has the function of uniting believers into a single community.23 Ben-
jamin’s suggested functional definition of religion is that religion is an activity 
that has the clinical function of alleviating negative psychological states, e.g., 
“anxieties”. Yet, as Berger and Kevin Schilbrack indicate, functional definitions 
have been challenged under the basis that they are too broad.24 
This would be the case because the functions that those who embrace 
functional definitions of religion associate with religion would have also been 
played by other activities that are not usually considered to be religions. Con-
sider the activity of cheering for a soccer team, e.g., the Brazilian soccer team 
from Rio de Janeiro, Vasco da Gama. This team’s fans usually sing a song cal-
led "Vasco, minha paixão!", that is, "Vasco, my passion!"25. This song conclu-
des with the verse, “Vasco da Gama, religion.” Indeed, the activity of cheering 
for Vasco seems to have the stated functions associated with religion by Dur-
kheim and Benjamin. However, to call this activity a religion is a disputable 
move.26 This is so even if there seems to be no ordinary meaning of the term 
“religion” universally shared.27 The problem is that given the apparent absence 
of such meaning, it is not easy to articulate a use of the term “religion” that is 
neither excessively broad nor excessively narrow. 
There have also been substantial definitions that seek to define religion in 
terms of a distinctive commitment. Edward Burnett Tylor may have been the 
first to provide a substantive definition of religion in arguing that religion is 
a commitment to spiritual beings.28 It is not obvious, though, whether Tylor 
precisely spells out, or whether conditions for a being to be called a spiritual 
one have been or could have been precisely spelled out. For the essay’s pur-
poses, it suffices to underline that Tylor’s stated substantive definition might 
23  Durkheim, É. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, NY: Free Press, 1995.
24  Berger, Sacred Canopy, p. 175; and Schilbrack, “What Isn’t Religion?”, p. 291.
25 This song’s original lyrics in Portuguese can be found in the following website (accessed in 
September of 2021): https://www.letras.mus.br/vasco-da-gama/1254370/
26  This move yet is suggested by Griffiths, P. J. Problems of Religious Diversity. Maden: Blackwell, 
2011, p. 15. For a more detailed discussion of soccer in Brazil, see the texts gathered in Damatta, 
R., Neves, L. F. B., Guedes, S. L. and Vogel, A. Universo do futebol: esporte e sociedade brasileira, Rio 
de Janeiro: Edições Pinakotheke, 1982.
27  For a case for this claim, see Martin, C. Masking Hegemony: A Genealogy of Liberalism, Religion 
and the Private Sphere, London: Equinox, 2010.
28  Tylor, E. B. Religion in Primitive Culture. MA: Peter Smith, 1970.
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be excessively narrow. Arguably, this is so if the conditions for a being to be 
spiritual are too restrict in implying, say, that given that Buddhists are not 
committed to spiritual beings, Buddhism is not a religion.29 There are several 
other substantial definitions in the literature, such as one that Agamben belie-
ves to be a “good definition”, even though he never explicitly embraces it or 
spells out what activities would fall into its referential domain. This substan-
tial definition is that religion is an “attempt to construct an entire universe on 
the basis of a command.”30 This definition may also be too narrow because it 
seems to exclude from its referential domain activities that have been called 
religions, such as Buddhism.
Under the influence of Schilbrack, it is claimed here, then, that a plausi-
ble use of the term “religion” is one that is both functional and substantive 
in seeking to be neither excessively broad nor excessively narrow. Such use 
can be provided if the stated functional definition by Benjamin is combined 
with another substantive definition: that religion involves commitment to at 
least one highly controversial claim. This kind of claim is one: whose truth-
-value cannot be determinable through means widely shared among religious 
and non-religious people; and inclines critics of religion (e.g., David Hume, 
Friedrich Nietzsche or Rudolf Carnap) to take it to be a false, cognitively 
meaningless or politically dangerous claim. To put it in Agamben’s terms, a 
“command” (e.g., “one must act in accordance with God’s will”) is an example 
of a highly controversial claim. Note that a claim can be called so even if it 
does not resort to a concept of God. For instance, the following claim is also 
a highly controversial one: “one is to maximize one’s egalitarian tendencies 
in detriment of one’s libertarian ones while while only engaging oneself in 
sexual practices with the intent of reproduction". This essay proposes, then, 
the following use of the term “religion”:
(R
d
): Religion is identical to an activity that has the clinical function of alle-
viating negative psychological states by more or less explicitly or implicitly 
showing commitment to at least one highly controversial claim.
This essay does not take this definition to be exhaustive or more accurate 
than other definitions of religion present in the literature. What is supported 
29  For a more detailed take on this issue, see Horton, R. Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West: 
Essays on Magic, Religion and Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
30 Agamben, Creation, p. 59.
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here is that (R
d
) is a plausible use of the term “religion” insofar as it is neither 
excessively broad nor excessively narrow. This use excludes the activity of 
cheering for Vasco from the domain of religion in that, in doing so, one might, 
but does not usually seem to show commitment to any highly controversial 
claim. Given that Buddhism has this commitment and plays the stated clini-
cal function, (R
d
) includes Buddhism in the domain of religion. Thus, this 





stated semantic condition is met. This is because the proposed uses of “capi-
talism” and “religion” neither rely on confusing vague terms nor imply that 
the predicate “religion” is somehow “contained” in the subject, “capitalism”, 
so that (CiR) would be an analytic or somehow trivially true by definition 




) are embraced, (CiR) is to be interpreted as 
an interesting synthetic claim translatable into: 
(CiR)`: The pursuit of profit through a continuous, rational and purportedly 
morally good business-activity that is supposed to be an end in itself has 
the clinical function of alleviating negative psychological states by more 
or less explicitly or implicitly showing commitment to at least one highly 
controversial claim.
The epistemic condition
There is another reason for not considering (R
d
) to be an excessively narrow 
definition of religion: this definition also includes within the domain of reli-
gion activities that have been traditionally called so. Consider the claim that:
(PiR): Protestantism is identical to a religion in the sense of (R
d
) insofar 
as it has the clinical function of alleviating negative psychological states 
by more or less explicitly showing commitment to at least one highly 
controversial claim.
(PiR) is a considerably uncontroversial claim. The reason is that to show that 
this claim is a persuasive or true claim, one only needs to rely on upfront em-
pirical justificatory resources, e.g., to promote a poll in asking Protestants if 
they attribute to Protestantism the features (PiR) attributes to this religion; to 
observe the behavior of Protestants so that it can be determined whether Pro-
testantism has had the stated clinical function and its followers have commit-
ted themselves to at least one highly controversial claim; and/or to determine 
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whether this is the case by interpreting core Protestant writings, e.g., those of 
Martin Luther, John Calvin, Richard Baxter, John Bunyan, August Hermann 
Francke, the 1646 Westminster Confession of Faith, etc. The latter justifi-
catory resource is adopted by Weber. In doing so, he describes differences 
between sub-sects of Protestantism, such as Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism 
and the Baptist sects. This essay does not aim to describe these differences in 
addressing all kinds of noticeable historical factors approached by Weber.31 
What is crucial is to underline that Weber’s reading of core Protestant writings 
is an upfront empirical justification that provides sufficient evidence to back 
up (PiR) in indicating three core features that most, several or at least some 
Protestants share, regardless of their contextual peculiarities.
The first feature is that Protestants have experienced at least one negative 
psychological state: a particular state of doubt. This is the state of being uncer-
tain on whether one is part of God’s chosen people who will be rewarded for 
their behaviors in this world by being allowed into paradise. “The question, 
Am I one of the elect?”, Weber argues in this direction, “must sooner or later 
have arisen for every believer and have forced all other interests into the back-
ground.”32 The second core feature is that Protestants have tried to alleviate the 
state of doubt by means of an ascetic behavior in seeking to control emotions 
and bodily urges while engaging themselves in a business-activity for a signifi-
cant time. “The Puritan”, Weber claims, “like every rational type of asceticism, 
tried to enable a man to maintain and act upon his constant motives, espe-
cially those which it taught him itself, against the emotions.”33 “The end of this 
asceticism”, Weber continues, “was to be able to lead an alert, intelligent life: 
31  Examples of such factors that show that Protestantism is not a (so to speak) “homogenous” re-
ligion immune to historical change or to cultural context are: late 16th century German Protestants 
influenced by Martin Luther’s reformation had behaviors and defended claims quite distinct from 
those of British 17th century Calvinists; the latter’s behaviors and claims were also considerably dif-
ferent from those of the Puritans who establish the New England colonies in North America; the 
17th and 18th century Dutch Quakers did not read Christian scriptures exactly like such Puritans; 
etc. Examples of other noticeable but more recent historical factors that took place after Weber’s 
time that will also not be addressed here are: the behaviors and claims of contemporary wealthy 
white-skinned North American Protestants who have supported Trump’s government are signi-
ficantly distinct from those of contemporary more impoverish black-skinned North American 
Protestants who have opposed such government; both of these believers are also quite dissimilar 
from, say, contemporary Brazilian neo-evangelicals who have lived in the so-called favelas and 
supported the government of Brazil’s current President, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, etc. 
32  Weber, Ethic, p. 65.
33  Ibid., p. 73.
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the most urgent task the destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment.”34 
For Protestants, this attitude of self-control is to be adopted not by isolating 
oneself from the rest of the community, e.g., in living in a monastery. Indeed, 
the importance of properly religious institutions is considerably attenuated 
by Protestants. This is because the attitude of self-control is to be pursued in 
performing “mundane occupations”, that is, a “worldly [business] activity” of 
everyday life.35 To do so would be a legitimate “technical means (…) of getting 
rid of the fear of damnation.”36  These passages indicate that Protestants have 
a third core feature: in seeking to alleviate the aforementioned state of doubt 
through the stated behavior, they have more or less consciously committed 
themselves to highly controversial claims, such as:
(Pro-Ont): There is a God who privileges those who seek to control their 
emotions and bodily urges by pursuing profit through a continuous, ratio-
nal and purportedly morally good business-activity.
(Pro-Mod): This God defines and distinguishes the domain of possibilities 
from that of impossibilities in including, for instance, a particular possibility 
in the former domain and a particular impossibility in the latter domain: 
respectively, the possibility of a financially successful businessperson being al-
lowed into paradise; and the impossibility of this occurring with a non-ascetic 
financially unsuccessful person who is not engaged in any business-activity.
(Pro-Pra): One must act in accordance with this God’s will by seeking to 
control one’s emotions and bodily urges in pursuing profit through a conti-
nuous, rational and purportedly morally good business-activity.
From the considerably uncontroversial claim, (PiR), it does not follow that 
Protestantism caused or at least partially caused capitalism (in the sense sta-
ted in C
d
). As Alastair Hamilton and Sam Whimster indicate, this claim has 
often been attributed to Weber.37 Benjamin suggests so in claiming that We-
ber believes that capitalism was “a formation conditioned by religion”, that 
34  Id.
35  Ibid., p. 74.
36  Ibid., p. 69.
37  See Hamilton, “Weber”, p. 162; and Whimster, Understanding, p. 119.
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is, by Protestantism.38 Moreover, Weber has often been criticized under the 
basis that the stated causal-explanatory claim lacks persuasion, say, insofar 
capitalism existed before Protestantism or was caused by other factors, e.g., 
“geographical discoveries, technological progress, the operations of the great 
trading companies.”39 On his part, Weber explicitly states that he “has no 
intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as 
that the spirit of capitalism (…) could only have arisen as the result of cer-
tain effects of the Reformation.”40 “In itself”, Weber continues, “the fact that 
certain important forms of capitalistic business organization are known to be 
considerably older than the Reformation is a sufficient refutation of such a 
claim.”41 This essay, accordingly, neither defends nor attributes to Weber the 
stated causal-explanatory claim. 
Another claim traditionally attributed to Weber is what may be called a 
vague secularization claim: the claim that a secularization occurred from Pro-
testantism to capitalism. This is what Agamben suggests in stating that for We-
ber, capitalism represents a “secularization of the Protestant faith.”42 The vague 
secularization claim deserves to be called so because it is not obvious what 
exactly a “secularization” (‘säkularisation”) is. It is also not obvious how Weber 
understands this term, which he only uses twice in the Protestant Ethic, without 
never explicitly committing himself to the vague secularization claim.43 Indeed, 
whether Weber is committed to this claim is not an issue that matters here. 
What is important is to emphasize that there is a plausible way of applying 
the term “secularization” in a more precise way that is closely connected to the 
definition of religion (that is, R
d
) proposed in section 1. This way assumes that 
secularization is identical to a process whereby: people of a certain region (e.g., 
the former New England colonies) who once aimed to alleviate their negati-
ve psychological states by committing themselves to at least one highly con-
troversial claim more or less directly give rise to people (e.g., contemporary 
New Yorkers) who seek to alleviate their negative psychological states without 
38  Benjamin, “Capitalism”, p. 288.
39  Hamilton, “Weber”, p. 162.
40  Weber, Ethic, p. 49.
41  Id.
42  Agamben, Creation, p. 67.
43  See Weber, Ethic, p. 7 and p. 173.
268 Felipe G. A. Moreira
O que nos faz pensar, Rio de Janeiro, v.29, n.48, p.256-276, jan.-jun.2021
committing themselves to these claims. By the expression “more or less indi-
rectly give rise to”, let us understand the action of influencing and/or giving 
birth to people who, on their part, influence and/or give birth to other people 
and so on in the course of several years. Granted the stated view on the term 
“secularization”, it does not seem that a secularization occurred from Protes-
tantism to capitalism. Instead, what seems to have taken place may be called a 
process of pseudo-secularization: a process whereby people of a certain region 
who once aimed to alleviate their negative psychological states by consciously 
or explicitly committing themselves to at least one highly controversial claim 
more or less indirectly give rise to people who continue to do so more “subtly” 
by unconsciously or implicitly committing themselves to these claims. 
The process of pseudo-secularization from Protestantism to capitalism will 
be more precisely described in what follows. First, let us underline that capi-
talism is, as Agamben puts it, “the religion of modernity” insofar as the current 
majority (at least in the West) seems to believe it.44 Moreover, it seems that an 
upfront empirical justificatory resource implicitly applied by Benjamin and 
Agamben is sufficient to spell out the core features of capitalists. The resource 
is that of making a basic observation of culture, especially of contemporary 
culture in wealthy English-speaking countries, such as the USA. This obser-
vation shows that: distinct from several (if not most) Protestants, there have 
been capitalists who have not experienced the mental state of being uncertain 
on whether one is part of God’s chosen people who will be rewarded for their 
behaviors in this world by being allowed into paradise. In fact, basic observa-
tion shows that there are, indeed, capitalists who are consciously skeptic about 
the existence of a paradise or any kind of God. This observation also indicates 
that the first core feature of capitalists is that they have yet experienced nega-
tive psychological states, such as the states of wanting, but feeling guilt or fear 
of being unable to: achieve financial success by one’s own means and merits; 
acquire material goods; become famous; be well-liked and popular among 
one’s peers, friends and family; afford the college tuition of one’s kids; etc.
Whether capitalism is a way of dealing with guilt or “makes guilt pervasi-
ve”, as Benjamin claims, is a matter on which this essay suspends judgment.45 
What is more crucial is to claim that basic observation of culture also shows 
44  Agamben, Creation, p. 67.
45  Benjamin, “Capitalism”, p. 288. For a more detailed view on Benjamin’s take on guilt, see 
Silva, J.C. “O capitalismo como religião: a culpa”. In: Cadernos Walter Benjamin, v. 23, pp. 162-
192, 2019.
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a second core feature of capitalists: that they have aimed to alleviate their ne-
gative psychological states by freely or somehow freely engaging themselves 
in business-activities for a significant amount of time. This is how this essay 
interprets a view by Benjamin likewise endorsed by Agamben: that “capita-
lism is a purely cultic religion” for which there are “no weekdays” and “no 
day that is not a feast.”46 This is to state that whereas Protestantism attenuates 
the importance of properly religious institutions, the religion of capitalism 
does not need them. 
The reason is that one can practice the religion of capitalism by engaging 
oneself in a business-activity in places which are not usually described as 
being religious, such as: stockbrokers' offices in Wall Street; banks; head-
quarters of multinational companies (e.g., Microsoft, Amazon or Facebook) 
ran by multibillionaires; etc. These competitive places may be depicted as 
the “holy places of cult” of the religion of capitalism where capitalists ulti-
mately put their faith in money. As Agamben underlines, in Hebrews 11: 1, 
Paul states that “faith is the substance of things hoped for.”47 Money, then, 
may be described as something whose substance is hoped for by capitalists. 
This is especially because money was emancipated from any concrete refe-
rent, since “August 15, 1971, when the American government, under the 
presidency of Richard Nixon, declared that the convertibility of the dollar 
into gold was suspended.”48
This essay is also neutral on whether capitalists have mainly engaged 
themselves in business-activities in an ascetic way in controlling their emo-
tions and bodily urges, or in a more contradictory way, say, in seeking to 
control such emotions and urges in workplaces, while expressing them even 
excessively after working hours by: hiring prostitutes; consuming porno-
graphy; drinking disproportionately; taking drugs; etc. What is apparent is 
that capitalists have employed all kinds of means in seeking to pursue profit 
through a continuous, rational and purportedly morally good business-acti-
vity. Note that Trump states: “I’ll do nearly anything within legal bounds to 
46  Id. and Agamben, Creation, p. 67. For a more detailed reading of this passage by Benjamin, 
consider Löwy, M. “Capitalism as Religion: Walter Benjamin and Max Weber”, in: Historical Ma-
terialism 17, pp. 60–73, 2009.
47  Agamben, Creation, p. 69.
48  Id. 
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win.”49 The way Trump applies terms, such as “winner” and “loser”, varies 
with context and is not very precise. It is plausible to interpret, though, that, 
for him, a “winner” is someone who by all kinds of means actively pursues 
profit through a continuous, rational and purportedly morally good busines-
s-activity. A loser is someone who has a more reactive attitude in not engaging 
oneself in this pursuit, and ultimately resenting those who do so. In Trump’s 
words, “there are people — I categorize them as life’s losers — who get their 
sense of accomplishment and achievement from trying to stop others.”50 Gi-
ven that Trump has pursued and guided others into the stated profit pursuit, 
he describes himself as a winner. “I’m not bragging”, he states, “when I say 
that I’m a winner. I have experience in winning. That’s what we call leader-
ship. That means that people will follow me and be inspired by what I do.”51 
This would have occurred, Trump underlines, due to Trump’s own merits. 
“Fred Trump [Trump’s father] was a rich man”, Trump states, “but he made 
sure his kids worked hard. (…) We had to work for what we got.”52 
A third core feature of capitalists backed up by basic observation of cul-
ture is that: while seeking to alleviate their negative psychological states by 
engaging themselves in business-activities, capitalists have also more or less 
unconsciously or implicitly committed themselves to at least one highly con-
troversial claim. Reasons for attributing this commitment to people who may 
not be consciously committed to at least one highly controversial claim will 
be spelled out in the next section. First, let us emphasize that a reason for 
taking capitalists to be hardly distinguishable from Protestants is that they 
have more or less unconsciously or implicitly committed themselves to at 
least one of the following highly controversial claims, which are not easily 
distinguishable from (Pro-Ont), (Pro-Mod) and (Pro-Pra):
(Cap-Ont): There is a God who privileges those who by all kinds of means 
pursue profit through a continuous, rational and purportedly morally good 
business-activity.
49  Trump, Art, p. 108.
50  Trump, Art, p. 59.
51  Trump, Great, p. 9.
52  Ibid., p. 128.
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(Cap-Mod): This God defines and distinguishes the domain of possibilities 
from that of impossibilities in including, for instance, a particular possibi-
lity in the former domain and a particular impossibility in the latter do-
main: respectively, the possibility of a financially successful businessperson 
(that is, a “winner”) being allowed into paradise; and the impossibility of 
this occurring with a financially unsuccessful person (that is, a “loser”).
(Cap-Pra): One must act in accordance with this God’s will by using all 
kinds of means in pursuing profit through a continuous, rational and pur-
portedly morally good business-activity.
The process of pseudo-secularization from Protestantism to capitalism can, 
then, be more precisely described as being one whereby: Protestants who 
aimed to alleviate their negative psychological states by more or less cons-
ciously or explicitly committing themselves to (Pro-Ont), (Pro-Mod) and 
(Pro-Pra) more or less indirectly have given rise to capitalists who more or 
less unconsciously or implicitly commit themselves to (Cap-Ont), (Cap-Mod) 
and (Cap-Pra). In fact, it is ultimately hard to differentiate Protestants from 
capitalists. This section’s conclusion, then, is that the defense of (CiR) ar-
ticulated here meets the epistemic condition insofar as the described basic 
observation of culture (that is, a quite unproblematic and empirical justifica-
tory resource that may be embraced by religious and non-religious people) 
justifies belief in (CiR). So, it is read that (CiR) is likewise an a-posteriori 
claim whose truth or at least persuasiveness or plausibility was indicated 
throughout this section.
The Revisionist Condition
It may be objected that the last section’s conclusion does not follow. The rea-
son would be that basic observation of culture is not sufficient to spell out the 
third feature attributed to capitalists: that they are more or less unconsciously 
or implicitly committed to at least one highly controversial claim, such as 
(Cap-Ont), (Cap-Mod) and (Cap-Pra). Capitalists, the objector emphasizes, 
are prima facie non-religious people who follow critics of religion in taking 
these claims to be false, cognitively meaningless or politically dangerous. Let 
us start to reply by emphasizing that not all, but only several or perhaps even 
merely some capitalists are prima facie non-religious people. Trump states: 
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“people who have God in their lives receive a tremendous amount of joy and 
satisfaction from their faith.”53 He also states that he has belonged to Protes-
tant churches throughout his life.54 Indeed, Trump explicitly acknowledges 
that he has been influenced by Reverend Norman Vincent Peale who “would 
instill a very positive feeling about God that also made me feel positive about 
myself.”55 “I go to church, I love God, and I love having a relationship with 
Him,” Trump states.56 Trump, then, is living evidence that it is not easy to 
distinguish Protestants who read the bible from capitalists who write and/or 
follow self-help books on how to be financially successful. “I think the Bible 
is the most important book ever written”, Trump states. “Perhaps”, Trump 
jokes while at the same time spelling out in all seriousness his capitalist spirit, 
“the Art of the Deal is second. (Just kidding!).” In short, Trump concludes: 
“God is in my life every day.”57 
So, a feature of Trump’s politics that has not yet been much considered 
even by Jason Stanley’s careful analysis deserves attention: Trump constantly 
resorts to a notion of God in his political speeches, while suggesting that this 
God sanctions his policies that seek to allow winners to keep wining while gi-
ving no “charity” to losers who ultimately are to be held responsible for their 
poor financial situation.58 Examples of such policies are those of seeking: 
to increase patriotism while passing more restrict rules for accepting immi-
grants into the USA and intensifying the deportation of illegal immigrants; 
and to diminish or abolish the healthcare subsidies of Obamacare in aiming 
to reduce so-called “big state.” In his Inaugural Address from 20 January 2017, 
Trump states: “when you open your heart to patriotism, there is no room for 
prejudice. The Bible tells us, “how good and pleasant it is when God’s people 
live together in unity”.”59 In his Speech at the Boy Scout Jamboree from 24 July 
2017, Trump states that “the words ‘duty,’ ‘country’ and ‘God’ are beautiful 
53  Ibid., p. 128.
54  See ibid., p. 129.
55  Ibid., p. 129.
56  Ibid., p. 130. 
57  Id. 
58  Stanley, J. How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. NY: Random House, 2018.
59  Trump, D. Inaugural Address (20 January 2017), accessed on March of 2021, https://millercen-
ter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-20-2017-inaugural-address
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words”.60 “Above all else”, Trump states in his Remarks at the Conservative 
Political Action Conference on 23 February 2018, that in “America, we don’t 
worship government, we worship God.”61
These passages are sufficient evidence that Trump is a sort of a “reverend” 
of the religion of capitalism who champions what might be called a process 
of re-religionization; a process whereby capitalists who aimed to alleviate 
their negative psychological states by more or less unconsciously or implicitly 
committing themselves to (Cap-Ont), (Cap-Mod) and/or (Cap-Pra) more or 
less indirectly have given rise to capitalists, such as Trump, who more or less 
consciously or explicitly do so. Let us yet grant the aforementioned objec-
tor that some if not several capitalists are, indeed, prima facie non-religious 
people who follow critics of religion in taking claims, such as (Cap-Ont), 
(Cap-Mod), and (Cap-Pra), to be false, cognitively meaningless or politically 
dangerous. Given that this essay attributes to these people an unconscious or 
implicit commitment to at least one of these claims, a last condition must be 
met: the revisionist condition of providing a justification for revising ordinary 
use of language in calling prima facie non-religious people who embrace the 
purportedly religion of capitalism, religious people. 
Descriptively speaking, it is hard to determine how exactly the concept 
of “religious person” has been used. Indeed, like the concepts of “capitalism” 
and “religion”, this concept may be one that lacks a precise ordinary meaning. 
It is yet granted to the objector that basic observation of culture indicates 
that prima facie non-religious people with the following features have not 
been usually described as being religious people: they have experienced the 
negative psychological states of guilt and fear; they have aimed to alleviate 
these states by freely or somehow freely engaging themselves in business-ac-
tivities for a significant amount of time; they have admired and aimed to be 
multibillionaires; they have bought self-help books that give advice on how 
to become financially successful; etc. Normatively speaking, this essay’s view 
is that the concept of “religious person” is to be revised so that it includes 
in its referential domain prima facie non-religious people whose behaviors 
have these features.  This move allows one to make sense of these behaviors 
60  Trump, D. Speech at the Boy Scout Jamboree (July 24th, 2017), accessed on March of 2021, https://
millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-24-2017-speech-boy-scout-jamboree
61  Trump, D. Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference ( 23 February 2018), ac-
cessed on March of 2021, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-
-23-2018-remarks-conservative-political-action
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by claiming that those who endorse them have done so because they more 
or less unconsciously or implicitly have been committed to claims, such as 
(Cap-Ont), (Cap-Mod) or (Cap-Pra). This is so, regardless of whether these 
people more or less consciously or explicitly have taken these claims to be 
false, cognitively meaningless or politically dangerous. 
Another reason for revising the ordinary notion of religious person is that 
this allows one to pressure such prima facie non-religious people to become 
more self-aware of themselves. They can do so by: dropping their behaviors; 
justifying or at least aiming to justify them; or acknowledging that they are 
authoritarians whose behaviors have an ultimate anarchic character. One way 
to further justify such described behaviors is by consciously or explicitly 
acknowledging one’s commitments, and making cases for (Cap-Ont), (Cap-
-Mod), or (Cap-Pra). The italicized term “anarchic” is used here in a literal 
yet not usually endorsed sense indicated by Agamben: that this term qualifies 
that which has “no archē, no beginning or foundation.”62 Note that capitalists 
could acknowledge the anarchic character of their behaviors by explicitly 
embracing another claim that is just as highly controversial as (Cap-Ont), 
(Cap-Mod) or (Cap-Pra):
(Cap-Ana): Regardless of whether (Cap-Ont), (Cap-Mod) or (Cap-Pra) 
are true, we must behave as we have done just because.
There is also a third reason for revising the concept of “religious person” so 
that it includes within its referential domain prima facie non-religious people 
who, nonetheless, are religious people in the sense that they believe in the 
religion of capitalism: this move also allows one to push for freedom from this 
religion. This religion, as Benjamin and Agamben argue, has been the domi-
nant one endorsed by the majority (at least in Western societies). The religion 
of capitalism also “subtly” coerces practically all of us into joining it insofar 
as this religion’s “heretics” face the risk of being excessively financially poor, 
financially dependent on others, financially independent but living isolated 
from the rest of the community; etc. As Weber puts it, “the Puritan wanted to 
work in a calling; we are [‘subtly’] forced to do so.”63 This occurs amid socie-
ties, such as wealthy-English speaking ones, that value freedom from standard 
62  Agamben, Creation, p. 75.
63  Weber, Ethic, p. 123.
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religions but do not recognize that capitalism itself is a religion that over-cons-
trains people’s freedom of being atheists or of believing in other religions.
So, the revisionist condition was also met by the defense of (CiR) articula-
ted here. Given that this defense also satisfies the semantic condition and the 
epistemic one, this essay bolstered Benjamin’s and Agamben’s previous cases 
for (CiR) in reading this claim as a synthetic, a-posteriori and literal claim that 
serves, not only one’s libertarian tendencies, but also egalitarian ones. This 
is so in that it has been showed that this claim is to cause some consensus, 
especially, among “heretics” who may be unwilling to act as if (Cap-Ont), 
(Cap-Mod), (Cap-Pra) and/or (Cap-Ana) were religious dogmas.
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